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ARTICLES
TAXING DEVELOPMENT: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS
OF TRAFFIC IMPACT FEES
JACK ESTILL, M.A.*
BENJAMIN POWELL, PH.D.**
EDWARD STRINGHAM, PH.D.***

I. INTRODUCTION

Should municipalities charge developers fees for negatively impacting residents?
New developments often use existing or require new infrastructure and services,
including roads, sewers, refuse collection, parks, fire protection, police, and
schools. Even though developers can often provide the necessary infrastructure
within their own developments as part of the construction process, impacts from
new development may spill over into existing communities, requiring additional
capital improvements.'
When governments provide these services and
infrastructure to users for "free," who should pay? Over the past fifty years,
governments have increasingly charged new developments impact fees for
imposing costs on communities.' The modem Pigovian idea is that governments
can set a fee at the value of the impact to internalize externalities and thereby
encourage an economically efficient amount of development.' Hypothetically then,
local governments can charge the development a fee equal to the impact it causes,
* Jack Estill has a Master of Arts in Economics, is a successful business owner, and
teaches as a guest lecturer at San Jose State University.

** Benjamin Powell is an assistant professor of economics at San Jose State University
and the Director of the Center on Entrepreneurial Innovation at the Independent Institute.

*** Edward Stringham is an assistant professor of economics at San Jose State University
and President of the Association of Private Enterprise Education.
' Jerry Kolo & Todd J. Dicker, PracticalIssues in Adopting Local Impact Fees, 25(3) ST.
& Loc. GOV'T REV. 197, 197 (1993).
2 WILLIAM ABBOTT, MARIAN MOE & MARILEE HANSON, PUBLIC NEEDS AND PRIVATE

DOLLARS 51 (Solano Press Books 1993).
3 See ROBERT FRANK, MICROECONOMICS AND BEHAVIOR 634-39 (McGraw-Hill, Inc. 6"'

ed. 2006) for a discussion of Pigovian tax theory by which governments correct marginal

externalities by measuring them and setting fees at exactly that level.
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thereby internalizing this externality. If the exact value of the external impact is
known, its imposition as a fee can encourage the economically efficient amount of
development. However, despite the increasing popularity of development impact
fees, several issues make the government's "economically efficient" solution easier
said than done.4
This article discusses the legality of traffic impact fees and illustrates the
problems with their use. Contemporary U.S. law suggests that municipalities
should base fees on a rational nexus of costs and benefits and on rough
proportionality of a fee with the external cost imposed by new development.5 How
do governments measure these external costs? Can governments assess the
marginal impacts of all homes before they are built? Do all developments have the
same marginal impact on infrastructure, and if not, should governments impose
different fees based on the impact? Without an exact measure, a government will
inevitably undercharge some developments and overcharge others, making
"economically efficient" development impossible. In the absence of markets with
actual prices for these common pool resources, governments will face numerous
calculation problems.
Even if governments could determine exact marginal impacts, implementation
problems nevertheless arise due to public choice concerns. 6 Existing residents,
politicians, and bureaucrats have incentives to support higher fees for several
reasons. 7
First, residents receive a free ride when fees support existing
infrastructure.8 Additionally, high fees increase the cost of development and thus
the price of new homes.9 This translates into higher prices for its substituteexisting homes.'
Therefore, existing residents have little reason to oppose
exorbitant fees on new development." Politicians and bureaucrats also have an
incentive to support higher fees because these fees increase their budgets. 2
Furthermore, existing residents are a politician's constituents, so he or she will
curry favor with them rather than appeasing the needs of potential residents. 3 In
light of these problems, traffic impact fees are unlikely to internalize externalities
For the various difficulties, many of which we will discuss later at length, see Kolo &
Dicker, supra note 1, at 197-206.
5 See ABBOTT, MOE & HANSON, supra note 2, at 52-55 for a good overview of past and
current law on impact fees.
6 See infra footnotes 129-33 and accompanying text, discussing public choice theory.
7 See infra section II. C.
4

8 MARLA DRESCH & STEVEN M. SHEFFRIN, PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA,
WHO PAYS FOR DEVELOPMENT FEES AND ExACTIONS?,

at v (June 1997), http://www.ppic.org/

content/pubs/report/R.697SSR.pdf.
9 Id.
1' Id.
" JOHN LANDIS ET AL., DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, PAY
TO PLAY: RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT FEES IN CALIFORNIA CITIES AND COUNTIES,

(2001).
12 See infra notes
'"

205-14 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 214-19 and accompanying text.
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in any Pigovian sense.
Section I1 provides a history of fees and exactions in the United States and
California 4 and reviews the important legal issues surrounding their application.
Section III discusses the economics of impact fees and provides evidence of the
level of traffic impact fees in various cities in California. It further concludes that
the variation of fees among jurisdictions indicates that at least some cities are
miscalculating or misusing traffic impact fees. Section IV offers some alternatives
to impact fees that would use the market to internalize all costs through
privatization.
Developers could provide the roads and connectors of new
developments and turn them over to residents to maintain upon completion. The
application of electronic tolling could privatize highways and thoroughfares and
thereby match revenue with costs, reduce government debt, and discourage
congestion. Finally, residents adjoining existing streets could organize street
owners associations to take control of the existing grid. Similar privatization
methods could apply to other improvements and services, as well. Section V
provides some concluding remarks.
II.

LEGAL HISTORY OF FEES AND EXACTIONS

Land development requires supporting services and infrastructure, such as roads,
utilities, parks and schools, as well as police, fire, and solid waste disposal. 5
Accordingly, new development often requires improvements to such services and
Historically, because public expenditures spurred private
infrastructure.' 6
investment,'7 municipalities financed these improvements with bonds and local
property taxes, supplemented by state and federal grants and subdivision
dedications and fees. 8 However, a combination of more complex (and more
costly) improvements, environmental considerations, a dramatic decline in federal
expenditures on local infrastructure in the 1980s, 9 and the property tax revolt
epitomized by Proposition 13 in California has led local governments to search for
other methods of financing needed infrastructure.2 ° Exactions and impact fees have
grown increasingly popular with local governments as a supplementary financing
source. By the mid 1980s, approximately 60% of local governments were using
impact fees along with in-kind levies. 2'
'" California is one of the leaders in the development of impact fees. See Dennis H. Ross
& Scott Ian Thorpe, Impact Fees: PracticalGuidefor Calculationand Implementation, 118

J. URB. PLAN. & DEV. 106, 106 (1992).
'" David L. Callies, Exactions, Impact Fees and Other Land Development Conditions,
1998 NAT'L PLAN. CONF. PROC. 1, availableat http://www.design.asu.edulapa/
proceedings98/Callies/callies2.html.
16 Id.
'7

Kolo & Dicker, supra note 1, at 197.

18 Id.

'9 Callies, supra note 15, at 1.
20 Ross & Thorpe, supra note 14, at 107.
21 ALAN A. ALTSHULER, Jost A. G6MEZ-IBA1Z4EZ & ARNOLD M. HowITT, REGULATION FOR
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For decades, local governments had used exactions-the on-site construction of
public facilities or dedication of land for public use.22 In the 1920s, they began
instituting impact fees-also called exactions-as a new local financing tool.23
Where no appropriate land was available for a traditional exaction, developers
could substitute off-site land or a fee in lieu of a dedication.24 Over time, these fees
came to include capital costs for on- and off-site improvements brought about by
new development.2 ' Rooted in the idea that new developments should pay their
own way,26 municipalities have increasingly used impact fees to pay for
improvements that property taxes traditionally financed.27 "According to the State
Controller's Office, fees and service charges account for almost 20% of annual
local government revenues., 28 These fees are generally a one-time charge on new
development by local government as a condition of approval for a building permit
to pay the development's proportional share of capital improvements.29 California
law defines a "fee" as a monetary exaction "other than a tax or special
Fees share two characteristics with taxes: they are levied on
assessment."3
developers as a monetary charge, and they are often assessed on a proportional
basis. However, localities cannot tax without specific legislative authority from the
state. 3 This distinction between taxes and fees is important in the evolution of
impact fees. Although impact fees, exactions, in-lieu fees, and compulsory
dedications are often synonymous as conditions precedent to obtaining final
development approvals, 32 courts sometimes treat dedications differently from
impact or in-lieu fees. The courts have reviewed dedications and impact fees
through a series of cases in an attempt to more clearly define their appropriate use
and proper legal role.
The legal basis for government intervention in the development process is its
police power to protect the public health, safety, and welfare of its citizens.33 In
Berman v. Parker, Justice William 0. Douglas stated, "[t]he concept of public
welfare is broad and inclusive .... It is within the power of the legislature to

REVENUE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAND USE EXACTIONS
23

Callies, supranote 15, at 1.
Kolo & Dicker, supra note 1, at 197.

24

Id.

22

Id.
Ross & Thorpe, supra note 14, at 107.
27 ABBOTT, MOE & HANSON, supra note 2,at 51.
28 WILLIAM ABBOTT, PETER M. DETWILER, M. THOMAS

36-37

(1993).

25
26

JACOBSEN, MARGARET SOHAGI &

HARRIET STEINER, EXACTIONS AND IMPACT FEES IN CALIFORNIA 15

(2001).

Shishir Mathur, Paul Waddell & Hilda Blanco, The Effect of Impact Fees on the Price
ofNew Single-family Housing, 41 URB.STUD., 1303, 1303 (June 2004).
30 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66000 (West 2005).
31 See Nick Rosenberg, Development Impact Fees: Is Limited Cost Internalization
29

Actually Smart Growth?, 30 B.C. ENVT'L. AFF. L. REV. 641, 642-43 (2003).
32

See Callies, supra note 15, at 1, for a similar treatment of these terms as synonymous.

33 DANIEL J. CURTIN, JR. & CECILY
th

LAW 1 (25 ed.

T.TALBERT,

CALIFORNIA LAND USE AND PLANNING

2005).
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determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as
well as clean, well balanced as well as carefully patrolled."34 In California, this
police power is enumerated in Article XI, Sect. 7 of the Constitution. Cities have
the power to "make and enforce within limits all local police, sanitary, and other
ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws."35 CaliforniaBuilding
Industry Ass'n v. Governing Board of the Newhall School District confirms this
power.36 Prior to the United States Supreme Court's 1987 decision in FirstEnglish
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,37 California
courts had held that unreasonable land-use regulations that denied all beneficial use
of property did not require damage awards; rather, landowners were limited to
seeking judicial invalidation.38 First English overturned this view, holding that
such takings required compensation under the Just Compensation Clause of the
Fifth Amendment as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.39 This
determination effectively imposed a restraint on local governments' police power.4 °
Later cases confirmed that a taking consists of permanently depriving a landowner
of all economically viable use of their land; partial and temporary limitations,
however, generally did not constitute a taking.4
As far back as 1949, California courts have sought a connection between a
project's conditions and its impacts. In Ayres v. City Council, the California
Supreme Court upheld the dedication of a street right-of-way abutting a subdivision
as having a reasonable connection to the subdivision, even though the city
benefited more than the subdivision's residents.42 In Candid Enterprises, Inc. v.
Grossmont Union High School District, the California Supreme Court held that as
long as local government is subordinate to state law and limits its powers to its own
jurisdiction, its police power "is as broad as the police power exercisable by the
'
Legislature itself."43
This local police power is inherent, so it is not necessary that
the state delegate it." The local government must conform to the Constitution's
due process requirements, and those actions must be reasonable and non-

34 Berman
31

v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).

CURTIN & TALBERT,supra note 33, at 1 (quoting CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7).

36 Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass'n v. Governing Bd. of the Newhall Sch. Dist., 253 Cal. Rptr. 497,
509 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); CURTIN & TALBERT,supra note 33, at 314.
3' First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of L.A., 482 U.S.
304 (1987).
38 See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25, 28 (Cal. 1979).
39 FirstEnglish, 482 U.S. at 322. See also CURTIN & TALBERT,supra note 33, at 289.
40 FirstEnglish, 482 U.S. at 321.
41 CURTIN & TALBERT, supra note 33, at 285. See also id. at 263-312 (full discussion of
takings jurisprudence).
42 Ayres v. City Council, 207 P.2d 1, 7-8 (Cal. 1949). See also CURTIN & TALBERT, supra

note 33, at 316-17.
41 Candid Enters., Inc. v. Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 705 P.2d 876, 882 (Cal.
1985).
44 CURTIN

& TALBERT, supra note 33, at 2. See also CandidEnters., 705 P.2d at 882.
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discriminatory.45 The court established that the necessity and form of regulation
encompassed in the police power "is primarily a legislative and not judicial
function" and that the courts may only review such regulations for reasonableness
with respect to legislative intent, rather than to what the court believes the
regulation should be.46
After the court's confirmation of the police power of local governments to
establish fees and exactions, a series of cases in the 1970s and 1980s began
delineating the limitations to that power.47 Two cases stand out. First, Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission established that a rationalconnection (nexus) must
exist between an imposed condition and the development in which the landowner
engages. 41 In this case, a landowner proposed to remodel and expand an existing
beach house and requested a permit from the Coastal Commission for the
reconstruction. 49 As a condition of the permit, the Commission required the
landowner to dedicate an easement for public use of one-third of the property along
the ocean as beach access."
The California Court of Appeal upheld the
Commission's police power under its duty to protect the coast. 5'
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision. 2 The Commission argued that
the easement increased public access to the shore and decreased the psychological
barrier to the beach created by continuous development between the street and the
sea. 3 The Court found that the imposed easement provided no relief for this
psychological barrier,54 nor did it remedy any added congestion potentially created
by the building.5
It is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that people already on
the public beaches be able to walk across the Nollans' property reduces any
obstacles to viewing the beach created by the new house. It is also impossible
to understand how it lowers any "psychological barrier" to using the public
beaches, or how it helps to remedy any additional congestion on them caused
by construction of the Nollans' new house. We therefore find that the
Commission's imposition of the permit condition cannot be treated as an
exercise of its land use power for any of these purposes.56
& TALBERT, supra note 33, at 20. See also G & D Holland Constr. Co. v. City
of Marysville, 91 Cal. Rptr. 227, 229-30 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970).
41 CURTIN
46

CURTIN &

TALBERT,

supra note 33, at 4. See also Consol. Rock Prod. Co. v. City of

L.A., 370 P.2d 342, 346 (Cal. 1962).
47 Callies, supra note 15, at 2.
48 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837
(1987).
49 Id. at 828.
50 id.
51 Callies, supra note

15, at 3. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 223 Cal. Rptr. 28, 31

(Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
52 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 842.
13 Id. at 838; Kolo & Dicker, supra note 1, at 198.
14 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 838; ABBOTT, MOE & HANSON, supra note 2, at 63.
" Nollan, 483 U.S. at 838-39.
56 Id.
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The Court stated that if the Commission had imposed a condition with an
essential nexus to the deleterious effects stated, it would have upheld that
condition. 7 Because this was not the case, the Commission's condition amounted
to a taking:
[T]he lack of nexus between the condition and the original purpose of the
building restriction converts that purpose into something other than what it
was. The purpose then becomes, quite simply, the obtaining of an easement to
serve some valid government purpose, but without payment of compensation.
Whatever may be the outer limits of "legitimate state interests" in the takings
and land-use context, this is not one of them.58
The Court also implied that the actual conveyance of property might require a
closer nexus than the payment of fees,59 a position later followed by the California
6
Court of Appeal in Blue Jeans Equity West v. City and County of San Francisco.
"
However, Nollan was sufficient to establish the "rational nexus" condition for
exactions."
In the second case, Dolan v. City of Tigard,62 the Supreme Court established that
imposed development conditions must promote a legal public interest, have a
rational connection to the development, and additionally must be reasonably
related63 to the impact of the proposed development.64 Dolan sought a building
permit to double the size of her construction supply business and pave a 39-space
parking lot.65 As a condition of the permit, the City of Tigard imposed the
dedication of a bike path and greenway/floodplain easements under the
comprehensive land use plan developed in Tigard's Community Development
Code (CDC).66 The City maintained that the bikeway could offset some of the
traffic impact of the proposed enlarged business and that greenway dedication of all
property within the flood plain could offset the proposed additional impervious
pavement.67 Dolan properly but unsuccessfully appealed through local and state
administrative channels, the Oregon courts, and ultimately to the U.S. Supreme
Court, which granted certiorari.6" The Court applied a three-pronged analysis.69
First, they found that the conditions promoted a legitimate public interest in

IId. at 836.
58 Id. at 837.
'9
60

Id. at 840-41.

Blue Jeans Equity W. v. City & County of S.F., 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 114, 118 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992). See also CURTIN & TALBERT, supra note 33, at 318-19.
61 Callies, supra note 15, at 4.
62 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
63 The court describes this as a requirement of "rough proportionality." Id. at 391.
64 Callies, supra note 15, at 5.
65 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 379.
66 Id. at 379-80; Callies, supra note 15, at 4.
67 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 381-82; Callies, supra note 15, at 4.
68 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 382-83; Callies, supra note 15, at 5.
69 Callies, supra note 15, at 5.
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preventing flooding and reducing traffic.7 ° Second, they found that there was a
rational nexus between flood prevention and limiting impervious surfaces in the
flood plain, as well as between traffic reduction and encouraging bicycle use.7
However, the Court found that there was insufficient connection between the
required dedications and the projected impacts of the development.
The City used "tentative" findings to relate the storm water flow and traffic
increase to the property, and these findings were insufficient to justify the breadth
of conditions imposed.73 The Court imposed a "rough proportionality" test and
stated that "[n]o precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must
make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is
related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development."74
Additionally, the Court noted that the city had given no justification for requiring a
public easement rather than a private easement for flood control.75 The ability to
exclude, the Court found, is "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights
that are commonly characterized as property."76
Following Nollan and Dolan, courts have struck down many land development
conditions for lack of nexus or proportionality.77 However, because both cases dealt
primarily with land dedications, it remained unclear how the heightened standards
applied to fees in lieu of dedications. The California Supreme Court answered this
question in Ehrlich v. City of Culver City.78 In the 1970s, Ehrlich acquired an
undeveloped 2.4-acre parcel and requested a general plan and zoning change for a
specific plan to develop a private tennis club.79 In 1981, due to financial losses, he
applied to change the land use and construct an office building instead.8" Ehrlich
did not proceed with construction after the planning commission voted against the
application based on the City's need for commercial recreation sites.8 In 1988,
after continuing financial losses, Ehrlich applied for a general plan amendment of
the specific plan, and a zoning change to build a thirty-unit condominium project
valued at $10 million.82 When the application was denied, Ehrlich demolished the
facility and donated the athletic equipment to the City.83 Ehrlich filed suit against
the City while entering into negotiations with them for the condominium
70

Dolan, 512 U.S. at 387; Callies, supra note 15, at 5.

7' Dolan, 512 U.S. at 387-88; Callies, supra note 15, at 5.
72

Dolan, 512 U.S. at 393-95; Callies, supra note 15, at 5.

73 Callies, supra note 15, at 5 (quoting Dolan, 512 U.S. at 388-89).
74 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391; Callies, supra note 15, at 5-6.

" Dolan, 512 U.S. at 393.
76 Id. (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
77 See generally Callies, supra note 15, at 6-10 (discussing land dedication cases around

the United States).
78 Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996).
79 Id. at 433-34.
80

Id. at 434.

81 Id.
82
83

Id.
Id.
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construction.84 After a closed-door meeting, the City approved the condominiums
conditioned on the payment of fees: $280,000 for a recreation mitigation fee (based
on partial replacement of lost recreational facilities), $33,200 for public art, and
$30,000 for parkland.85 Ehrlich protested under sections 66020 and 66021 of the
California Government Code8 6 and challenged the recreation and art fees, but not
the parkland fee.87 The trial court found in favor of Ehrlich invalidating the
recreation fee, but not the art fee.88 The appeals court, however, reversed the
invalidation of the recreation fee.89 The United States Supreme Court remanded the
case back to the appeals court in light of Dolan; and, in 1994, the appeals court
again upheld the fees.9°
At this point, the California Supreme Court agreed to consider the application of
Nollan and Dolan to development fees, as opposed to dedications.91 The court
found that ad hoc development conditions based on individual negotiations
between a developer and a local government pose "an inherent and heightened risk"
that the government would use its police powers to impose conditions unrelated to
the impacts of development and avoid paying just compensation.92 The court
distinguished legislatively created impact fees imposed on a class of landowners
from individual ad hoc fees: "in land use 'bargains' between property owners and
regulatory bodies.., where the individual property owner-developer seeks to
negotiate approval of a planned development.., the combined Nollan and Dolan
test quintessentially applies."93 Additionally, looking to Blue Jeans Equity West in
which the court upheld a "traffic impact development fee" on commercial project
outside of the downtown core,94 the Ehrlich court found that heightened scrutiny
was unnecessary where legislative action on a broad class of properties established
and ad hoc assessments, however, must meet
dedicated assessments.95 Dedications
96
the heightened scrutiny test.
Later decisions supported the holding in Ehrlich, including Loyola Marymount
University v. Los Angeles Unified School Districtand San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City
and County of San Francisco.97 Justice Thomas of the United States Supreme
Id.
8 Id. at 434-35.
84

87

&TALBERT, supra note 33, at 323.
Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 435.

88

id.

89

Id.

86 CURTIN

90Id. at 436; CURTIN & TALBERT, supra note 33, at 323.
9' See Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 438.
92 Id. at 439.
93 Id. at 438.
94 Blue Jeans Equity W. v. City & County of S.F., 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 114, 119 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992); accordCommercial Builders of N. Cal. v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 874-75
(9th Cir. 1991) (upholding a low-income housing fee on nonresidential development).
9'Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 444. See also CURTIN &TALBERT, supra note 33, at 324.
96 Callies, supra note 15, at 8.
97 CURTIN & TALBERT, supra note 33, at 324. See also San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City &
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Court, however, dissented in the denial of certiorari for a Georgia case, stating that
the distinction between legislative and ad hoc assessments is a "distinction without
a constitutional difference."98 Because the Ehrlich case was ad hoc,99 the court
It found a rational nexus between the planned
applied the Nollan/Dolan test.'
condominium's removal of potential recreation space due to its zoning change and
the recreation mitigation fee, but struck down the fee as disproportional to the
impact because the city provided no individualized findings between the exactions
The court remanded the matter to the city council for
and loss of zoning.'
reconsideration of the amount of the fee based on the court holding.0 2 Finally, the
court required that a party that challenges a development fee must follow
established statutory procedure, must pay the fee under protest, and must file suit
within 180 days. 013
It is worth noting that in San Remo, where the California Supreme Court upheld
replacement housing in-lieu fees for a condominium conversion, there was a close
four to three vote, and Associate Justice Janice Rogers Brown entered a sharp
dissent. 4 In her dissent, Justice Brown supported private property, finding it an
endangered species in California and entirely extinct in San Francisco. 5 The City
had established policies where property owners were subject to the whim of the
majority, or worse, to the power brokers independent of the majority: "Where once
government was a necessary evil because it protected private property, now private
property is a necessary evil because it funds government programs."'0 6 Justice
Brown found the ordinance that imposed these fees unconstitutional under the
Takings Clause of the California Constitution. 7 The plaintiffs filed a federal
challenge to the fees, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed its dismissal
because the decision by the California Supreme Court precluded their federal
action."' The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari only on the issue of
preclusion and so did not reach the merits of the case.0 9 The Court dismissed the

County of S.F., 41 P.3d 87, 102 (Cal. 2002); Loyola Marymount Univ. v. L.A. Unified Sch.
Dist., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 424, 434-35 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
98 Parking Ass'n of Ga. v. City of Atlanta, 515 U.S. 1116, 1118 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). See also Callies, supra note 15, at 8.
99 CURTIN & TALBERT, supranote 33, at 323-24.
'0o Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 447.
101 Id.

& TALBERT, supra note 33, at 325. The Ehrlich court also upheld the public art
fee as a land use regulation based on the city's police power to control aesthetics rather than
as an exaction. Id.
102 CURTIN

103 Id.

San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of S.F., 41 P.3d 87, 88 (Cal. 2002).
120 (Brown, J., dissenting).
'06 Id. See also CURTIN & TALBERT, supra note 33, at 328.
107 San Remo Hotel, 41 P.3d at 128 (Brown, J., dissenting).
'o8 San Remo Hotel v. City and County of S.F., 545 U.S. 323, 326-27 (2005).
'04

105 Id. at

109

San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 327 n. 1; CURTIN & TALBERT, supra note 33, at 329 n.7.
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case in June of 2005 on procedural grounds,'" finding the defendants' state court
endeavors "equivalent" to a federal trial"' and effectively denying heightened
scrutiny of the City's legislative authority to impose fees.
The California Supreme Court clearly distinguished between ad hoc and
legislatively imposed exactions." 2 Exaction abuses and private property advocacy
by builders' groups eventually led to "nexus legislation""' 3 under Assembly Bill
1600. ' 4 California established this legislation in 1987, effective as of January 1,
1989, which added sections 66000-66011 to the California Government Code." 5 In
1996, in light of Ehrlich, the Legislature relabeled sections 66000-66025 the
"Mitigation Fee Act" ("Act")." 6 In the Act, the Legislature amended the definition
of a fee to include both legislatively imposed and ad hoc fees." 7 Currently, a
government entity imposing an impact fee on development projects must: establish
the purpose of the fee, establish the use of the fee including public facilities to be
financed, show a reasonable nexus between the purpose of the fee and the type of
development, show a reasonable relationship between the public facility which the
fee will finance and the type of development on which it imposes the fee, show a
reasonable relationship between the specific amount of the fee and the cost of
public facilities attributable to the project, and account for and spend collected fees
only for the purposes intended with provision for the return of unexpended funds." 8
The final condition includes provisions requiring the government entity to
deposit, invest, account for, and expend the fees, as well as account for unexpended
or uncommitted funds once each fiscal year." 9 The entity must identify a schedule
of improvements and adopt a capital improvement plan within 180 days of
determining that sufficient funds were collected.'
Within 180 days of the closing
of the fiscal year, there must be a full accounting of the funds and a review of the
accounting by the local government council at its next regularly scheduled meeting,

"o San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 335.
I. Id. (quoting San Remo Hotel v. City and County of S.F., 364 F.3d 1088, 1098 (9th Cir.
2004)); Michael Berger, San Remo Hotel: When Ship Comes In-But Only Passes By, L.A.
DAILY J., July 11, 2005, at 2-3.
"12 Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429,
447 (Cal. 1996).
113CURTIN & TALBERT, supra note 33, at 329.
"4 Laura Westrup, Cal. Dep't of Parks & Recreation, Quimby Act
101: An Abbreviated
Overview, CAL. PARKS & RECREATION, Summer 2002, at 8, available at
http://www.cprs.org/membersonly/Sum02-Quimby.htm.
15CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 66000-66011 (West 1989); CURTIN & TALBERT, supra note 33,
at 329.
"6 CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 66000-66025 (West 1996); CURTIN & TALBERT, supra note 33,
at 329.
117 CURTIN & TALBERT, supra note 33, at 329.
118 See id. (citing §§ 66001(a), 66001(b), and 66006); Ross & Thorpe, supra note 14, at
108.
"9
120

§ 66006(a); CURTIN & TALBERT, supra note 33, at 329.
CURTIN & TALBERT, supra note 33, at 329 (citing § 6600 1(e) and § 66002).

HeinOnline -- 16 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 11 2006-2007

PUBLICINTEREST LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 16

not less than fifteen days after it becomes available.'21 The Act establishes specific
procedures and a time line, including a ninety-day protest period when a landowner
or developer may contest a fee, of which the government entity must provide
written notice.' 22
Ultimately, the establishment of exactions rests on the police power of the state,
as established under Berman'23 and confirmed in California Building.2 4 Ayres
establishes the need for a connection between an exaction and a proposed
development.'25 Nollan and Dolan delineate the dimensions of the connection, i.e.,
rational nexus and rough proportionality, at least with respect to dedications of
land.'26 Ehrlich extends the Nollan/Dolan test to individually negotiated, or ad hoc,
monetary exactions, while legislatively imposed monetary exactions on a broad
class of properties require a lesser degree of documentation to establish
proportionality under current California law.'27
Although the Act clarified what is required to impose impact fees, municipalities
still abuse these fees. Using California traffic impact fees, this article will show
that many local governments have not taken into account the full effect of the
economic difficulties posed. Many commentators consider traffic fees the best
example of successful impact fees,' 28 but if even these fees fail to live up to the
Pigovian ideal, we might question the desirability of development impact fees in
general.
III. ECONOMICS OF TRAFFIC IMPACT FEES
Developers make decisions on what and where to build based on perceived costs
and benefits.'29 In each development, they need to provide an efficient level and
mix of services that will maximize their profits. 3 ° New development requires
infrastructure, and to the extent that they can provide services within a project,
developers have the proper incentive to make an efficient allocation where the
benefit of these

services

matches

their cost. 13 1

Developers will

provide

infrastructure up to the point where additional infrastructure costs more than it

329-30 (citing § 66006(b)).
Id. at 330 (citing § 66020(d)(1)).
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass'n v. Governing Bd. of the Newhall Sch. Dist., 253 Cal. Rptr.

121 Id. at
122
123
124

497, 509 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
125 Ayres v. City Council, 207 P.2d 1, 7-8 (Cal. 1949).
126 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n,
483 U.S. 825, 834-45 (1987).
127 CURTIN & TALBERT, supra note 33, at 326.
128 See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 31, at 680-81; Callies, supra note 15, at 14.
129 ROBERT B. EKELUND, JR. & ROBERT D. TOLLISON, MICROECONOMICS:
MARKETS AND PUBLIC CHOICE 10

Id.
131 Id.

(6th ed. 2000) (describing marginal analysis).

130
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32
benefits the developer.1
The catch is that new development may have effects that spill over into
surrounding neighborhoods. In a zero transaction-cost world in which existing
residents own the common pool of resources in their neighborhoods, a developer
could bargain with and compensate residents to achieve an "efficient" level of
services where marginal costs and marginal benefits are equal. In reality, existing
residents do not own common pool resources, and the transaction costs of
bargaining are positive.'33 The idea is that the government should require
developers to pay city or county governments an impact fee or exaction to
compensate the public for the burden that the new development places on existing
services.'34 Government imposes these exactions-as a dedication, construction of
facilities, or fee in-lieu--on the new development as a condition of approval to
build.'35
According to Pigovian theory, an economically efficient amount of new
development will occur if the exaction precisely matches the costs which the new
development imposes on the community and the government spends the fees to
offset those costs.' 36 Although finding an economically efficient level of taxes may
be simple in a textbook, real world political difficulties may result in governments
setting fees at levels significantly above their marginal impact. As the Department
of Housing and Community Development ("HCD") reports, this clearly is the case
in California.'37 Under these circumstances, developers, landowners, and new
buyers suffer.'38 Developers respond to high exactions by building less, causing the
price of existing building stock to increase.'39 There is less developed property for
new residents, as well as for new and existing businesses, causing rents to rise,
businesses to close or relocate, and employment to fall. 4 Problems determining
132 Id.

See DAVID N. HYMAN, PUBLIC FINANCE: A CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION OF

THEORY TO POLICY 56-69 (8th ed. 2005) (discussing marginal costs, marginal benefits, and
efficiency).
113 EKELUND & TOLLISON, supra note 129, at 84.
134 Kolo & Dicker, supra note 1, at 197.
Id. at 197-98.
See generally EKELUND & TOLLISON, supra note 129, at 444.
137 LANDIS ET AL., supra note 11, at 1 ("California development fees are extremely high.
135
136

Single-family homebuilders in California in 1999 paid an average of $24,325 per unit in
residential development fees, based on the results of a sample of eighty-nine cities and
counties. Owners of new infill homes paid an average of $20,327 per unit. Apartment
developers paid an average of $15,531 per new apartment unit."). This report provides the
most comprehensive look at impact fees in California to date. Other reports had various
weaknesses, including reviewing only selected product types and/or selected fees, making
comparisons of disparate types of housing across jurisdictions, and focusing on specific
locales rather than on the state as a whole. Id. at 25. This study overcomes many of the
deficiencies of other surveys by using a detailed survey over a representative range of
statewide data (eighty-nine jurisdictions). Id. at 25-30.
38 See id. at 22-23; DRESCH & SHEFFRIN, supra note 8, at iv-v.
139See DRESCH & SHEFFRIN, supra note 8, at iv-v.
140 Cf id. at 22-24.
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the proper level of fees arise in both the calculation and the implementation of
exactions.
A. Basic economics of impactfees
Impact fees increase the price of housing and commercial development.
Although legally, development impact fees are not considered taxes, in the
traditional economic view, their effect is the same as a unit tax on new
development. 4' Taxes on new construction raise prices for consumers, lower
revenue of developers, depress prices for undeveloped land, and decrease the
quantity of new construction.' 42 Figure 1 illustrates the economic effect of an
impact fee on new development. The effective supply curve shifts up the level of
the impact fee, by increasing the price from P1 to P2 by the amount of the fee
which decreases the quantity from Q2 to Q1.' 43 Even if the fee is legally imposed
on the developer, the developer may pass some or all of the burden of the tax onto
other parties involved in a transaction. Some combination of buyers, builders, and
landowners must bear the burden of the tax.'"

' DRESCH & SHEFFRIN, supra note 8, at 17-26. See Larry D. Singell & Jane H. Lillydahl,
An EmpiricalExamination of the Effect of Impact Fees on the Housing Market, 66 LAND
ECON, 82 (Feb. 1990) for a more detailed analysis of impact fees.
142 DRESCH & SHEFFRIN, supra note 8,
at 25-28.
14 See Figure 1.
144 WILLIAM BOYLES & MICHAEL MELVIN, ECONOMICS 492 (6th ed. 2005).
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Figure 1. Increased Fees Make Development More Expensive.
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If the quantity of construction decreases by a large enough amount, government
revenue from impact fees may also decrease.' 45 Many jurisdictions mistakenly
think that increases in fees always lead to increased revenue.' 46 As fees increase,
however, the cost of developing increases.' 47 When fees are high enough, they may
discourage so much development that total revenue for government actually falls.' 48
At the limit, if fees are zero, total revenue from fees is zero.' 49 If fees are so large
that they deny the developer any income, no development takes place and total
revenue is again zero."' Figure 2 illustrates that, between these two limits, there is
a total revenue maximization point on the inverted U shape of the total revenue
curve.
See Figure 2.
The City of Salinas, California, implicitly assumed this when it calculated the amount
of revenue needed from traffic impact fees and divided it by the number of impositions. See
infra notes 178-79. See also Denis Collins, Fund Joltsfor City, N. Va; Gasoline Levy Results
145
146

Short of Expectations; New N. Va Gasoline Tax fails to give Expected Relief WASH. POST,

Dec. 14, 1980, at B1.
147See HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 381-82 (6th ed. 2002) (discussing the
economics of the Laffer Curve).
148 See id. at 381.
141
150

See id.

See id.
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Figure 2: Laffer Curve for Impact Fees.

SIZE OF IMPACT FEE
As impact fees increase, governments risk surpassing the maximum point on the
total revenue curve.
In California, impact fees are considerable. Among eighty-nine communities,
impact fees account for an average often percent of the median new home price. 5 '
Dresch and Sheffrin noted that the fees imposed on single-family dwellings in
Contra Costa County, California from 1992-1996 were significant, ranging from
$20,000-$30,000 per dwelling and as much as nineteen percent of the mean sales
price. 152 The HCD found that single-family home builders paid an average of
$24,325 in development fees for tract homes and $20,327 for in-fill homes,
whereas apartment developers paid $15,531 per new apartment unit.1 3 Though the
HCD reported that fees varied significantly across the state ($4,000 to over $60,000
per single-family dwelling'14 ), "[flees are highest relative to housing prices in the
State's fastest growing and most affordable communities.' 55 With relatively low
land costs and high levels of development, these communities' economies of scale
in construction lead to relatively low housing costs. However, they have little long-

151 LANDIS ETAL., supra note 11, at 2.
152 DRESCH & SHEFFRIN, supra note 8,

153LANDIS ET AL., supra note 11, at

Id. at 9.
"' Id. at 107.

at 74.

103.

14
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term infrastructure planning and financing and are more dependent than other
communities on development fees for infrastructure."5 6 Consequently, although
construction costs are low, fees are high. Many charge the highest fees as a
percentage of sale price (greater than fifteen percent), 57 and fast-growing,
affordable communities were more likely to have recently increased their fees than
slow-growing, expensive ones.'58 The HCD noted that among their sample, traffic
and transportation fees were the most frequently increased type of capital facility
fees,' 59 making up the bulk of exactions (approximately eighty percent). 6 °
Fees affect affordability by more than just their imposed amount. Because
municipalities normally collect fees at the start of the project, builders must include
fee interest (carrying costs)-in addition to the actual fee-in their overhead until a
house is sold and during any additional processing time. 6' Mathur et al. found that
in Washington State, from 1991-2000, this increase averaged 1.66 times the fee
and was larger for more expensive houses. 62 Though noting that the reasons for
the price effects needed further study, they found that their results were consistent
with Dresch and Sheffrin's 1997 results for the western part of Contra Costa
County, California showing a $1.88 increase in housing price for each $1.00 impact
fee increase. 63 Responding to the Mayor of Visalia's comment that fees do not
seem to have a chilling effect on housing sales,' 64 Robert Keenan of the Building
Industry Association of Kings/Tulare Counties (one of the fastest growing areas in
California) pointed out that fees and carrying costs do have a chilling effect: "Is his
assumption that because they're raising fees, we're selling more homes? ... The
real chilling effect is that local buyers are being priced out of the market.' 165 He
noted that fees reduce affordability quickly. 66 Housing statistics showed that from
the third quarter to the fourth quarter of 2004, Tulare County's affordability went
from first in the state at 46.4% of people at the median being able to afford a home
to only 40.1% when prices increased $12,000.16' Keenan stated, "That's 6.3% of
people making the median income who just got priced out in three months ....

156

Id.

157

Id. at 87.

158Id. at
159

56.

Id.

Id. at 103.
Mathur, Waddell & Blanco, supra note 29, at 1311.
162 Id. at 1308, 1311.
163 Id. at 1311 (citing DREscH & SHEFFRN, supra note 8).
'64 Tim Sheehan, Visalia Hikes Fees to Help Payfor Booming Growth, FRESNO
13, 2005, at Al.
160
161

165
166

BEE, Mar.

Id.
Id.

167 Id. This discussion was in response to a new round of fee increases that combined to
add over $11,000 to the price of Visalia's "average" new home. Id. One City Council
member worried that he had only been on the council a short time, but had already
considered two increases. Id.
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Fees do have a chilling effect."' 168 As Figure 1 above illustrates, increasing fees on
development leads to higher prices for consumers and a smaller quantity of
development. During periods of low demand, developers can pass fees and
exactions backwards to landowners, or landowners and developers can share
them.'69 However, in periods of high demand, typifying the California market in
recent years, developers tend to pass these fees forward to homebuyers. 7 ° In the
long run, high fees give developers an incentive to build more expensive homes,
making fees a smaller percentage of total price as the fees are charged per dwelling
unit rather than as a percentage of sales prices.' 7 ' They also encourage developers
to target higher income buyers, who may be less sensitive to price increases.' 72
Ultimately, fewer buyers can afford to purchase homes because of excessive impact
fees.' 73 To reverse this trend, the government must lower fees. The HCD estimates
that a fifty percent reduction in fees could result in a four to eight percent increase
in affordability'74 based on the reduction in fees alone (assuming the reduced fee
translated to a lower price on a dollar-for-dollar basis),'75 with potential increases in
affordability in at least one area (Brentwood) of fourteen percent. 176 A similar
reduction in fees could potentially increase apartment rent affordability by four to
eight percent.'77
Additionally, excessive fees discourage efficient commercial development. A
fee acts as a tax on new commercial development in the same manner as residential
development-by raising prices and reducing the amount of development that takes
place. Imagine a business that is contemplating opening a large 100,000 square
foot store in Salinas. Under a 2004 proposed fee increase,'78 the store's owner
would face a traffic impact fee of between $2,000,000 and $4,800,000, instead of
the current fee of $1,117,20017' and would have to weigh the benefit of being in
Salinas against the cost-savings of a nearby, lower-tax community.
Some
companies would locate elsewhere, leading to less construction and commercial
space, a lower tax base, fewer jobs, and higher business costs. A spatial shift of

168

Id.

169 LANDIS ET AL.,

supra note 11, at 23.

Id.
71 Id. at 3.

170

Id. at 3-4. See also Sheehan, supra note 164.
Sheehan, supra note 164.
174 LANDIS ET AL., supra note 11, at 96.
175Note that this is an estimate because, in areas and times of high demand, developers
may not reduce prices on a dollar-for-dollar basis, and it may take time for these reductions
to show up in housing prices. Id. At the same time, the reduction in fees may be reflected in
additional reductions due to the reduction in the multiplier effect. See id. at 95-97 for a
more thorough discussion,
176 Id. at 104.
171 Id. at 106.
178 Benjamin Powell & Edward Stringham, Economic Analysis of the Proposed Traffic
Fee Increases in Salinas 2 (Apr. 20, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the authors).
"9 Id. at 3, 9-10.
172

173
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commercial businesses from high-fee areas to low-fee areas would occur. 8 ' The
shift would also contribute to urban sprawl when the businesses moved to low-fee
communities beyond the urban limits.' 8'
B. Problems of calculatingfees

Although the elimination of impact fees would translate into more affordable
housing, advocates of impact fees believe that housing imposes negative
externalities, which municipalities should tax. As previously mentioned in
Pigovian theory, governments should set an exaction at the level of the impact that
new development imposes on existing infrastructure. For traffic impact within a
development, establishing the proper facilities for ingress and egress is relatively
simple.' 82 In fact, the simplest way to ensure the efficient cost/benefit nexus of
infrastructure within a development is to have the builder finance it himself.
However, the impact to surrounding neighborhoods is more problematic. Local
governments would need to quantify the impact by measuring traffic usage before
and after development, holding other possible causalities constant, and calculating
the burden of any increased usage imposed on other citizens.
Holding other causal factors constant, however, is easier said than done.
Whether increased traffic is solely from new development or from more intense use
in surrounding developments is not always clear. Is the number of drivers in all
households on average increasing, and are choices of labor and leisure changing,
affecting trip generation? Does the new development draw some traffic away from
Who is responsible for
other developments that previously received it?
neighboring traffic into the development? Is the development in-fill or outlying?' 83
Any one-size-fits-all or two-tiered system of traffic impact fees will not lead to a
Pigovian solution because each project will have a different marginal impact, yet be
charged the same fee. Consequently, fees set higher than a project's marginal
impact will discourage efficient development while fees set below the marginal
impact will encourage development with excess burdens. "In short, unlike the
private market where prices and costs function as efficiency signals, development
in encouraging efficient local land-use or capital
fees appear to play no ' part
84
improvements planning."'
The HCD noted that these fees are an inefficient way of paying for capital
infrastructure as that infrastructure is less expensive when built before it is
needed. 85 Exactions based on the next growth increment are necessarily higher
than they would be if tied to a realistic and comprehensive general plan established

supra note 11, at 9.
Id.
182 See id. at 43 (discussing calculation methods of local traffic mitigation fees).
183 Infill may not impose unplanned spillover, while outlying development may require
substantial connecting roads.
184 LANDIS ET AL., supra note 11, at 56.
180 LANDIS ET AL.,
181

185

Id. at 5.
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prior to development.1 6 The HCD found that the link between traffic impact fees
and long-term capital improvement is weak. 7
According to the HCD,
"[d]evelopment fees are higher than they should be .
8.8.."1"
In theory, the most efficient method of determining the impact of a development
is to value its marginal contribution to infrastructure.' 89 Suppose an -area is
undeveloped but has a general plan to accommodate 1,000 homes. With a longterm capital improvement plan funded and in place, each new development could
pay its incremental (marginal) share of the necessary improvements until the
completion of the general plan. In California, where such funding is generally
lacking and some development has already taken place,' 90 estimating marginal costs
is complicated. 9 ' Most fee determination is made on an average cost basis.'92
Average cost pricing is problematic for two reasons. First, it is difficult to separate
the impact of new development from improving conditions of existing
development.193 Second, if the average cost is the total improvement cost divided
by the current population, rather than total developed population, new development
pays a disproportionate share.' 94 While the California Supreme Court considers
this practice illegal, the HCD found, "it is implicit to some degree whenever fees
are set on the basis of average cost."' 95
The appropriate calculation of exactions is difficult. Government needs to know
the marginal impact that a development's drivers will have on the roads. The
impact of various projects is discrete and changes over time. This puts government
in a position akin to central planners, attempting to measure marginal costs or
marginal benefits of different actions in the absence of prices.' 96 Government can
attempt to create a formula in which it assumes that a certain type of development
generates a specific number of trips, but the marginal impact of these developments
will differ depending on the developments' locations. For example, the marginal
impact of a development in a part of town with plenty of empty roads will be much
less than a development in a congested area or in an area lacking roads. To truly
charge fees at the level of the marginal impact, the government needs to have a
different fee for each resident of each development based on how much, when, and
where they drive. This is not the current practice.
Many governments turn to average cost pricing as a substitute for measuring
186 Id.

Id. at 2.
,88Id. at 5.
I89at 16.
Id.
'90 Id. at 5, 106.
'9' Id. at 16.
192 Id. at 102.
'9' Id. at 16-17.
187

194

Id.

'9'

Id.

196

See generally Edward Stringham, Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency and the Problem of Central

at

17.

Planning,4 Q.J. AUSTRIAN ECON. 41 (2001) (discussing the problem of government decision

making in the absence of prices).
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marginal impact. 97 In many cases, the government decides how much it wants to
spend on road improvements. It subtracts the dollar amount that can be financed
through other means and then divides the remaining costs among all proposed
development. 9 This method is much easier to calculate but extremely flawed.
Why should developers in one part of town have to pay for the construction of a
road in a separate part of town where their customers will not drive? Despite the
legal requirement that fees have to be proportional with impact,' 99 in practice they
are not.
C. Politicalproblems of implementingfees
Individuals make choices based on incentives."' Prior to the introduction of
public choice theory,20' modern democratic government was generally viewed as
paternalistic and benevolent, making decisions to maximize social welfare. 0 2
Public choice exposes government actors to the scrutiny of economic analysis20 3
Fully
based on their rational self-interests just like private individuals. 2"
understanding the implementation of exactions requires understanding the
incentives of those who implement them, including politicians who propose the
exactions, current residents who vote for them, and bureaucrats who apply them.
Consider the incentives faced by a politician seeking to get elected. One
potentially perverse incentive is that politicians must cater to current residents
because future residents do not vote in current elections. Consequently, politicians
may focus on short-term policies that benefit current residents at the expense of
future residents. This focus can translate into incentives to engage in "fiscal
zoning ' to restrict residential development and to discourage some, or even all,
types of growth.20 6 For example, fiscal zoning may discourage apartments and low"'

LANDIS ET AL., supra note 11, at 16.

and Stringham encountered the City of Salinas attempting to use this method
with a proposed impact fee increase in 2004. See Peter Kasavan, Traffic Impact Fee Boost
Tempered a Bit, CALIFORNIAN (Salinas, Cal.), Apr 10, 2004, at 2D.
199 LANDIS ET AL., supra note 11, at 17.
198 Powell

200 STEVEN

3(1993).
201

E.LANDSBURG,

See MIT

THE ARMCHAIR ECONOMIST: ECONOMICS AND EVERYDAY LIFE

DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS

351 (David W. Pearce ed., 4th ed. 1992)

(defining public choice as "an economic analysis of politics").
202 BRIAN SNOWDON

&

HOWARD

R.

VANE, MODERN MACROECONOMICS: ITS ORIGINS,

DEVELOPMENT, AND CURRENT STATE 30, 518-21 (2005).
203 For an introduction to public choice economics, see WILLIAM

C.

MITCHELL

&

RANDY

T. SIMMONS, BEYOND POLITICS: MARKETS, WELFARE, AND THE FAILURE OF BUREAUCRACY

(1994); GORDON TULLOCK, ARTHUR
A PRIMER IN PUBLIC CHOICE (2002).

SELDON

& GORDON L.

BRADY, GOVERNMENT FAILURE:

204See EKELUND

& TOLLISON, supra note 129, at 457-79.
Fiscal zoning refers to the practice of using zoning laws to restrict perceived high cost,
low revenue development and encourage its opposite. See LANDIS ET AL., supra note 11, at
27.
206 Id. at 9, 27.
205
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cost starter homes 20 7 and instead encourage high-income housing which will
enhance local property values. This is particularly true where politicians view
development only in terms of present costs and not long-term benefits, such as
"increases in tax base, sales tax, employment, and other secondary and tertiary
benefits. '218 While high-income housing may increase specific property tax values,
overall tax value over time may fall as less development takes place.20 9 One way
politicians accomplish fiscal zoning is through implementing excessive exactions.
Politicians may use fees to encourage commercial development and discourage
housing to capture sales tax revenue and limit expenditures on additional public
services. 2
They may strategically set fees to either attract growth or divert
21
development where common markets exist for it among adjacent communities. '
As noted above,2" the average cost method most commonly used for fee estimation
requires new entrants to bear the cost of improving existing facilities. 2 3 While
these practices may hurt affordability, they can be good politics because they
benefit the current electorate and come at the expense of potential residents.214
Current residents can benefit from high impact fees in several ways. First, they
can limit low-income newcomers to their community by limiting high density or
low-cost housing through exclusionary zoning. Second, they can have new
development foot the bill for infrastructure upgrades that primarily benefit existing
residents.215 This particularly applies to traffic impact fees that represent a large
portion of capital fees (the majority category of fees) 216 when based on average cost
pricing,217 and where new development usage is difficult to separate from more
intensive use of existing improvements. 2 8 Third, while both of these policies will
decrease housing affordability, voters who already own their homes may not care.
Existing homes are a close substitute for new homes, and as fees drive up the cost
of new homes, existing home values increase (Figure 3).219
Id. at 17.
208Kolo & Dicker, supra note 1, at 201.
207

209 This is a fallacy of composition where what is true of the specific case is not true in
the aggregate. See Figure 2.
210 LANDIS ET AL., supra note 11, at 27.
211 Id.
212 See supra notes 189-99 and accompanying text.
213 LANDIS ET AL., supra note 11, at 9.
214 These practices also harm owners of raw, undeveloped land, but those owners are
often not residents of the community where the land is owned. Even if they are residents,
they only get one vote compared to the many votes of the owners of homes throughout the
community.
215 NAT'L

ASS'N OF HOME BUILDERS, CONSUMER GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING IMPACT

FEES 1 (2004), http://www.nahb.org/generic.aspx?sectionld
216 LANDIS ET AL., supra note 11, at 2.
217

Id. at 9.

218

See supra Section III. B.

=

1 2&genericContentlD=3792.

Note that the supply curve of existing houses is fixed (vertical) in the short run by
definition so that the whole fee is translated into higher prices.
219
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Figure 3. Increased Fee Makes Existing Homes More Expensive.
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Bureaucrats have incentives to support higher fees as well. For example, as the
local planning director becomes more important because of his or her role in
administering impact fee programs, he might be able to demand a higher salary and
benefit from having a larger planning staff, increasing the reach of his department,
his influence, and his future job opportunities.22 In addition, when bureaucrats
have the authority to waive fees, they are in a position to extract resources from
builders in other ways.
Thus, politicians, existing residents, and bureaucrats can find their incentives
aligned to raise fees excessively, creating inefficient outcomes.221 The economic
analysis of politics demonstrates that local governments' impact fees may not be
set based on some Pigovian model. The variation in fees among jurisdictions
indicates that politics may influence impact fees.
Variation in fees, in and of itself, is not flawed as new development may have
different impacts in different communities. If fees are set according to the Pigovian
criteria, cities with similar economic and demographic characteristics should have
similar fee structures validated by comprehensive nexus studies. Fees should vary
between jurisdictions according to differences in population, growth, age, density,
220 See Paul Wyckoff, The Simple Analytics of Slack-Maximizing Bureaucracy, 67 PUB.

CHOICE 35 (1990) for a detailed description of budget and slack-maximizing bureaucracies.
221 LANDIS ET AL., supra note 11, at 9.
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income, and development acti,'ity. However, if politics is driving fee structures in
California cities, fees could vary greatly with no obvious relationship to the above
characteristics.
Fees do vary widely across California-total development fees vary from 2% to
20% of new housing prices, which translated from $11,176 to $59,703 for singleFees vary similarly for apartments, but are $8,000 to
family tract homes. 22
223
Capital facility fees, the majority of which are traffic
$10,000 lower per unit.
fees, make up 80% of housing fees and 86% of apartment fees.224 Of all fees,
traffic fees varied the most among jurisdictions 225 and were the most frequently
increased capital facilities fees. 226 Figure 4 illustrates the level of traffic impact
fees by Californian city. Is the actual marginal traffic impact of an additional house
zero dollars in Santa Barbara and $7,000 in Berkeley? It's possible but unlikely.

222

Id. at 103-04.

223

Id.

224 Id. at
225 Id. at
226 Id. at

2.
22.
56.
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4. 1999 Residential Traffic

Because California courts have firmly upheld the nexus of development fees and
infrastructure costs (albeit in a more distant sense for legislative enactments),228
fees should vary in a predictable way. The HCD states, "[i]f the Mitigation Fee Act
is working as intended-that is, if there truly is a nexus between development fees
and capital facilities costs-then development fees should vary in ways that are
both recognizable and explainable. 2 2' 9 This, however, is not the case.
The HCD surveyed impact fees in eighty-nine communities in California. It
found that some charged a multitude of fees, while others charged only a few.230
Some communities charged a consolidated fee based on a schedule, while others
227
228
229

230

Id. at Appendix B.
See supra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
LANDIS ET AL., supra note 11, at 59.
Id. at 62.
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simply lumped fees together without explanation, leaving both staff and developers
"
without a reliable way to estimate project fees.23
' Fee collection appeared arbitrary
232
because of these methods.
The HCD used regression models to try to determine what caused the variation
in fees among jurisdictions. It controlled for type of jurisdiction (city or county),
population, population change, housing supply ratio, city age, gross density, per
capita net expenditure, and median household income. These models only
explained 48% of the variation in traffic fees between cities. 33 Only three factors
were significant, and they varied directly (fees moved in the same direction as each
variable): city age, median household income, and housing supply ratio.3 4 The
HCD ran nine different regressions, one for each type of impact fee a city charged,
i.e. planning fees, traffic, school, etc. The HCD model was able to explain as little
as 4% of the variation in a fee to as much as 48% of the variation."' The model
that considered the sum of all impact fees charged by cities was only able to
explain 24% of the variation in fees among cities.236
These regressions show that the explanatory variables provided a poor
explanation of fee variation.2 37 They were able to explain only 48% of the variation
in traffic and park fees, leaving 52% unexplained, while in-lieu fees leave 96% of
the variation unexplained.238
Overall, 76% of fee variation remained
unexplained. 23 9 Fees also varied inconsistently by and even within region. 24' Fees
did not substitute for public debt as might be expected if they cover capital
infrastructure. 24 ' This large variation in fees is strong evidence that impact fees are
set by politicians to benefit current residents and are not set to encourage
economically efficient development as the law requires. If one believes that the
fees are set proportionally to impact, we must conclude that the marginal impact on
traffic of additional residence is zero in Santa Monica, a few hundred dollars in San
Diego, and more than $10,000 in Brentwood.
The Act requires a reasonable connection between fees and actual impact;
communities are supposed to commission studies establishing this nexus and
update them at least every five years. 242 The studies should include projections of
population to be served, current and future service levels, determination of needed
future facilities with cost estimates, proper cost apportionment between new and
231

232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239

240
241

Id.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 79.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 78.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 86.

§§ 66001-66002 (West 1996). The plans are often referred to as
nexus studies and are certified by resolution or ordinance.
242

CAL. GOV'T CODE
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existing residents, and procedures for notification of fees and protest. 43 However,
twenty of eighty-nine jurisdictions surveyed could not produce even one nexus
study. 2" Few nexus studies were comprehensive, and most were simply city
council findings. 245 The studies were generally two to five years old, and cities had
few resources to update them.246 Seventeen cities had general studies; nine had
specific traffic studies, and thirty had a nexus study for at least one category of
usually employed average cost pricing
fee. 247 Where nexus studies existed, they 248
and were poorly linked to capital spending.
Impact fees in California are not set according to comprehensive studies that
match the marginal cost of development to the fee charged. The incentives of
politicians, current residents, and local bureaucrats are aligned to impose high fees
rather than any type of Pigovian fee. The fee setting process in California is ad hoc
and political.249 When combined with the difficulties of calculating proper fees (if
jurisdictions were so inclined) and the inefficiencies of their collection, traffic
impact fees are a flawed method of providing infrastructure. Some alternative
methods of infrastructure provision could avoid these problems.
IV. ALTERNATIVES

TO IMPACT FEES

Fees are far from some Pigovian ideal. Calculating each individual project's
specific impact is difficult, and using any single- or multi-tier average fee will
discourage some economically efficient developments. Additionally, developments
might impact a neighbor's subjective well-being in both positive and negative
ways. We have seen that impact fees are unlikely to successfully internalize
externalities, but are these extremely problematic impact fees the only option
available? Luckily, alternatives to impact fees exist. Simply changing the way
communities provide roads would allow developers and others to internalize these
costs. If road provision reforms could internalize all costs, there would be no
spillover costs and hence no need for inefficient impact fees. Some market
solutions will internalize these costs and be more efficient.
A. Traffic Alternatives
New development traffic costs spill over onto existing residents and city budgets
in three ways. New outlying development requires construction of new local roads
within the development and roads to connect it to the existing traffic grid. When
cities are responsible for constructing and/or maintaining these roads, existing
taxpayers bear some of the burden of new development if there are no impact fees.
243 LANDIS ET AL.,
244

Id. at 51.

245

Id.
Id.
Id. at 52-54.

246
247

248
249

supra note 11, at 50.

Id. at 5 1.
Id. at 49.
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New development also brings in more residents whose travel crowds major
highways and thoroughfares. Offsetting this burden often requires additional
highway lanes or new entrances. Taxpayers again bear the cost of construction.
Finally, the community's increased population burdens the existing local traffic
grid. This imposes costs on local residents through increased delays and gridlock
and through government expenditures to finance road widening and other traffic
control measures. The question remains: is the problem inherent to the market, or
is the problem due to the way government provides these common pool
resources?25 ° If government simply turned over the provision of roads to the
private sector,251 then the problem of externalities would not arise. As discussed
below, the market presents some potential solutions. 2
1. Local and Connecting Roads
It is possible to provide local roads within a new development and roads needed
to connect the development to the existing traffic grid without resorting to impact
fees. If local governments do not finance and construct these roads within a
development, then existing residents do not have to foot the bill. The potential
builder would have to bear the cost of installing the roads himself in order to
complete his project. This is already common with many developments in
California and elsewhere in the United States. 53 Because a developer can only sell
homes if they are accessible to their residents, the developer has an incentive to
install any necessary roads. Since the developer benefits from the roads and bears
the costs if they are not built, developers will construct only those projects where
the cost of development is less than the expected consumer value once the project
is complete. All costs and benefits of the local and connecting roads are borne by
the individual developer so that any local costs are internalized. Most importantly,
this would bring the design and placement of the roads into the realm of economic
calculation, which Ludwig von Mises finds essential.254 With private provision, the
developer will want to design the road system in a way that maximizes the final

250

See generally Bruce Benson,

Are Public Goods Really Common

Pools?

Considerations of the Evolution of Policing and Highways in England, 32 ECON. INQUIRY
249(1994).
251 See GABRIEL ROTH, ROADS IN A MARKET ECONOMY (1996) and STREET
SMART

(Gabriel Roth ed., 2006) for excellent discussions on alternative ways to construct, finance,
and operate roads.
252

253

See ROTH, supra note 251; STREET SMART, supra note 251.
Bruce Benson, Are Roads Public Goods, Club Goods, Private Goods, or Common

Pools? 38 (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors), available at
http://gamet.acns.fsu.edu/%7Ebbenson/hywys.doc.
254 No real price can be established for capital goods that are not traded in the market
place. Therefore, no true signal of the urgency of their need is available and no efficient
allocation of resources will take place. See LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A
TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 201-32 (Mises Institute 1998) for a thorough discussion of the

economic calculation as the guide for appropriate action.
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value of the new development. With local government provision, the profit and
loss system is absent, so governments have little information or incentive to
maximize the value of a specific tract.
In addition to construction costs, communities could also separate road
maintenance so that no costs spill over to the existing community. After the
development is completed, the beneficiaries of the local and connecting roads will
Many neighborhoods already have
be the residents of the development.
homeowners' (or street owners') associations to collect fees and pay for
maintenance of the streets. Home buyers can pay for a fraction of the cost of the
connecting roads along with the purchase price of the house. When structured this
way, existing local residents would not bear the immediate or future infrastructure
costs of servicing the new development. The new development would internalize
all costs of local and connecting roads, so there would be no need for impact fees to
finance them.
There is already much evidence that development in the United States can
provide its own local roads as private or club goods.255 Over 24 million U.S.
residents lived in gated communities in 1997,256 and this is only a fraction of the
total number of U.S. citizens living on privately provided roads.257 In short, there is
little theoretical or empirical justification for governments to fund the construction
and maintenance of local and connecting roads in new development through the use
of traffic impact fees.
2. Highways and Thoroughfares
Financing highways and thoroughfares solely by new development (if
developments are on a small scale) cannot be efficient because existing residents
also benefit from the construction or expansion. Requiring new developments to
bear the full burden of constructing or expanding these roads would inefficiently
discourage any development. 258 Efficient highway construction and improvement
mandate that those who benefit from the highway, i.e. drive on it, must be the ones
who pay for it. Currently, broad-based tax revenue, and not direct usage charges,
fund most highways. 9 Where broad-based taxes fund highway maintenance,
drivers do not pay the full cost of their use, so highways are often overcrowded and
underprovided. New development only compounds this problem by adding more
Because of the difficulties in calculating and
drivers to the highways.
255 See generally FRED FOLDVARY, PUBLIC GOODS AND PRIVATE COMMUNITIES (1994);
James Buchanan, An Economic Theory of Clubs, 32 ECONOMICA 1 (1965).
256 BRUCE BENSON,
257

To SERVE

AND PROTECT

93 (1998).

Bruce Benson, Are Roads Public Goods, Club Goods, Private Goods, or Common

Pools?, supra note 253, at 38.
258 See supra notes 184-88 and accompanying text.

Gasoline taxes are an inefficient method of financing roads because they do not
distinguish who drives on which roads and at what times. Different roads have different
demands and levels of congestion and, to operate efficiently, should have different prices to
reflect that. Gasoline taxes fail to do this.
259
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implementing impact fees on new development, any opportunity to provide or
maintain highways privately will enhance economic efficiency.
Private construction and maintenance of highways is less common today, but
many successful modem and historical examples of private provision exist. In
early America, private parties often constructed and financed turnpikes. 6 ° Between
1794 and 1840, 238 turnpike groups built and operated 3,750 miles of New
England private turnpikes. 261 Four thousand miles of private turnpikes traversed
New York by 182 1.262 Pennsylvania had about 2,400 miles in 1832, while
Maryland had 300 miles of private roads in 1830, and New Jersey companies
provided about 550 miles of private turnpikes in 1821.263 Overall, relative to the
size of the economy, colonial turnpikes in the early United States were larger than
the post-WWII interstate system.264
SR91 in Southern California is the most well-known, current U.S. example of a
privately constructed and operated highway. In 1995, $134 million of private
capital was spent to construct a four-lane, private toll highway adjacent to an
existing non-toll government highway in Orange County just east of Anaheim.265
The road is approximately ten miles long and charges a fixed toll that varies
between $1.00 and $5.50 depending on the time of day. 266 The road generates
annual revenue of approximately $29 million and has turned a profit every year
since 1998.267 In addition to shorter commute times, drivers report that the private
toll lanes are safer than the adjacent freeway. 268 The toll way also manages to
avoid the cost and delay of tollbooths by using one-hundred percent electronic toll
monitoring that allows drivers to continuously maintain highway speed.269
Orange County has several highways that, although not completely private,
follow the SR91 model. These highways comprise fifty-one miles of congestionrelieving toll roads operated by TCA, 27 ° a public/private transportation

260

See Daniel Klein, The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods? The Turnpike Companies

of Early America, in THE VOLUNTARY CITY 76 (David T. Beito, Peter Gordon & Alexander

Tabarrok eds., 2002) (discussing these turnpike companies and what mechanisms allowed
them to provide the roads).
261 Id. at 84.
262 Id.
263 Id.
264 Gerald Gunderson, Privatizationand the 19'h-Century Turnpike, 9 CATO J. 191, 192
(1989).
265 Edward C. Sullivan, HOT Lanes in Southern California,in STREET SMART, supra note
251, at 189, 191.
266 Id.
267 Id. at 197.
268 Id. at 209.
269 Id. at 196.
270 Press Release, Transportation Corridor Agencies/The Toll Roads, Toll Roads Save
Time,
Gas,
and
Money
(June
2006),
http://www.thetollroads.com/home/news-press.june06d.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2007).
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partnership. 7' Chicago recently joined in the move to privatization when it leased
the Chicago Skyway to a private Spanish/Australian investor group for ninety-nine
years for $1.83 billion. 7 Growing interest in toll roads spurred the second Bush
Administration to propose a new $100 million "Open Roads Financing Pilot
Program" to explore the expanded use of tolls.273
Privatization would provide another advantage in allowing governments to
reduce their borrowing needs or use their scarce revenue in other ways. Dana R.
Levenson, City of Chicago Chief Financial Officer, is quoted, "[t]his transaction,
which is the first of its kind in the nation, fulfills Mayor Daley's continued
commitment to pursue innovative financing techniques, and has provided Chicago
taxpayers with an unprecedented single, up-front payment of $1.83 billion that we
will use to invest in our people and protect Chicago's taxpayers both today and in
'
the future."274
Nevada is currently investigating toll roads to help ease a $3.8
billion shortfall in Nevada's highway budget between now and 2015.275 This
solution is becoming increasingly necessary as gas tax revenues shrink with more
fuel-efficient vehicles while, at the same time, the aging highway system requires
more maintenance.276 Indiana and New Jersey are currently studying the
privatization of state-owned facilities.277
Toll roads also offer an additional potential advantage: congestion pricing.
Many businesses already use congestion pricing. For instance, movie theaters
charge a low price on a midweek afternoon, when the additional cost of filling an
empty seat is close to zero, and a higher price on weekend evenings, when demand
is high and the number of people willing to fill a seat drives up its opportunity
cost. 279 Traffic congestion pricing is similar. 279 While the marginal cost of traffic

impacts from development is difficult to measure, existing road sensor technology
and FasTrak28 ° electronic tolling simplify measuring the marginal cost of

271

Transportation Corridor Agencies/The Toll Roads, About TCA - Background and

History, http://www.thetollroads.com/home/about history.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2007).

272 Peter Samuel, Chicago Skyway Handed over to Cintra-MacquarieAfter Wiring

$1830m, TOLLROADSNEWS, Jan. 25, 2005, http://www.tollroadsnews.info/artman/publish/
article_777.shtml (last visited Jan. 22, 2007).
273 Press Release, David Bauer, Editor, Washington Update, Am. Road & Transp.
Builders Ass'n (Feb. 13, 2006) (on file with authors).
274 Samuel, supra note 272.
275Brendan Riley, Nevada Task Force Eyes Toll Roads to Resolve Shortfall,
CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT GUIDE, Feb. 4, 2006.
276

Transportation Corridor Agencies/The Toll Roads, supra note 271.

277

Samuel, supra note 272.
& GREGORY

278 BRADLEY FLAMM

RosSTON, STAN. INST. FOR ECON. POL'Y RES., POLICY
BRIEF, TRAFFIC CONGESTION, CONGESTION PRICING, AND THE PRICE OF USING CALIFORNIA'S

FREEWAYS,
279
280

at 2, (Apr. 2005), http://siepr.stanford.edu/Papers/briefs/policybriefapr05.pdf.

Id.
FasTrak is the California Dept. of Transportation's electronic tolling system. See id. at
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congestion.28 SR91 in Orange County uses a variable-hour pricing system with
price fluctuations tied to historical traffic conditions.282 Many other countries are
experimenting with similar pricing schemes: London and Singapore practice simple
downtown daily driving fees; Norway, Hong Kong, the Netherlands, Italy, and
France use area, facility, or distance-based programs, and San Diego uses real-time
congestion data to change tolls up to every six minutes with electronic notification
to drivers.283 Although some argue that tolling unfairly disadvantages the poor,284 a
study of Orange County's SR91 showed that not only the wealthy used the toll
road. "The ability to save time and reduce uncertainty confers substantial benefits
to all drivers, including service professionals who can make more service calls and
'
parents of any income group rushing to avoid charges for child care."285
Not only
does congestion pricing reduce demand at peak travel periods, when it generates
profits, but it also provides the incentive to build more roads, further lowering the
costs of congestion. Private tolling provides both a demand and supply solution. It
is a better method of financing and operating new highways than charging new
development impact fees.
3. Existing Local Traffic Grid
If new developments had to pay for their own local and connecting roads and if
highways were privately provided and financed, the inefficiencies of development
impact fees would shrink significantly. The only traffic impact that would remain
would be increased congestion on existing local roads.
Here, too, each
development will have a different marginal impact, so fees will not provide the
Pigovian solution. The total "economic inefficiency" in this situation would,
however, be smaller than when fees cover all types of road construction. Even in
this instance, private alternatives could eliminate the need for impact fees.
Of the numerous ways of privatizing existing roads, one stands out.
Municipalities could simply turn over existing local roads to the residents who live
on them. New street owners' associations would form to establish rules, limit
access, and finance their maintenance.286 Streets with many commercial businesses
would likely find it advantageous to encourage usage so that the businesses could
attract customers (think of free streets around shopping malls), while residential
streets might try to limit access to only residents and guests (think of the gated
community with a single entrance). Each association would make these individual
21

See id.

Edward Sullivan, HOT Lanes in Southern California, in STREET SMART, supra note
251, at 189.
283 See FLAMM & ROSSTON, supra note 278, at 2.
284 Id. at 3.
285 Id.
286 Although charging tolls is a possibility, the transaction costs of this are likely too high
at present. In the future, the use of electronic tolls which charge drivers via satellite or
overhead monitor may overcome transaction costs allowing these roads to operate more like
modem toll financed private highways.
282
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decisions. Under this situation, existing local residents would be able to limit the
impact of new development to minimize spillover costs.
This privatization reform is the most radical change necessary to eliminate the
traffic impact of new development; however, it is not without precedent in the
United States. In the 1970s and 1980s, the city of St. Louis deeded back a number
of its existing streets to current residents to govern through street owners'
associations. The process began in 1970 when the Westminster Place area of St.
Louis petitioned the city to deed the streets back to the residents because they were
unhappy with the approximately 6,000 cars a day that were using the area as a
shortcut around major boulevards with traffic lights.287 The street owners'
association had responsibility for street, sewer, and streetlight maintenance;
garbage pickup; and the right to limit through-traffic and install speed bumps.288
The success of private street associations led to their spread in St. Louis. The city
had over 427 private street associations by 1982,289 and in two municipalities, such
associations provided more than 50 percent of the street mileage.29° Although the
privatization of the existing street grid is more complicated than it would be if
developers financed their own local and connecting roads and privatized highways,
the St. Louis case shows that it is an option.
If communities: (1) simply had developers build their own local and connecting
roads, (2) used toll roads to privatize highways and thoroughfares, and (3) deeded
back the existing traffic grid to local residents, then local development would no
longer create any spillover costs on local communities. The alleged need for traffic
impact fees would no longer exist.
B. Privatizationof OtherImpacts
In addition to traffic impacts, governments also often charge development impact
fees for water provision, sewers, storm systems, parks, schools, refuse collection,
and police and fire services. These goods are often considered public goods
because their provision has spillover effects on the community. However, when
attempting to charge developers for the marginal impact that their developments
cost the community, governments face the same calculation problems as occur with
traffic impact fees. An important alternative to government exactions for these
impacts exists. Advocates of impact fees usually overlook the simplest way of
eliminating this problem: private provision.
A large literature in economics demonstrates that the market can provide many
local "public goods" traditionally associated with local governments.2 9' Why
287 See Bruce Benson, Do Holdout Problems Make Compulsory Right-of-Way Purchase
and PublicProvision of Roads Necessary?, in STREET SMART, supra note 251, at 43.
288
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290 FOLDVARY, PUBLIC GOODS AND PRIVATE COMMUNITIES,
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supra note 255, at 191.

See TYLER COWEN, THE THEORY OF MARKET FAILURE (1988); FOLDVARY, PUBLIC
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would private enterprise have an incentive to provide positive public goods or
minimize negative externalities? Private parties will do so if they can internalize
those benefits. Harold Demsetz describes how they can accomplish this:
The enclosing of the land into a single ownership entity which often
undertakes to provide services usually provided by government from tax
revenue, such as streets, sidewalks, refuse collection, and even police
protection, allows the owner to exclude those who refuse to pay rentals which
cover the cost of these services.292
Market arrangements can take many forms, from contractual homeowners'
with multiple parties to multi-tenant income properties with a single
associations
293
owner.
Consider a proprietary community such as Disney World or Disney's privately
planned city, Celebration. These communities are essentially private cities that
internalize the production of local public goods.294 Disney provides private
security, sanitation, transit, streets, parks, and other civic goods and services295 to
residents and visitors over a forty-five square mile area.296
One important difference between private entities such as Disney and public
government is that the profit mechanism motivates and disciplines the former. An
advantage of the profit motive is that it aligns the incentives of proprietors with the
incentives of their customers because the proprietors can only make money if their
customers are satisfied.
Disney, for example, has an incentive to figure out and provide the optimal
amount of local public goods because they want to maximize the value of their
land. If they have refuse, crime, or sewer problems within their bounds, Disney
will suffer losses. The incentives for local governments, on the other hand, are
much less clear given the absence of prices, profits, and losses.297 If government

GOODS AND PRIVATE COMMUNITIES, supra

COMMUNITY,

(1970);

note 255;

SPENCER MACCALLUM, THE ART OF

MARKET FAILURE OR SUCCESS: THE NEW DEBATE (Tyler Cowen & Eric

Crampton eds., 2002); Spencer MacCallum, The Case for Land Lease Versus Subdivision:
Homeowners'AssociationsReconsidered, in THE VOLUNTARY CITY, supra note 260, at 371;
Spencer MacCallum, The Quickening of Social Evolution: Perspectives on Proprietary
(Entrepreneurial)Communities, 2 INDEP. REV. 287 (1997); Frederic Deng, Peter Gordon &

Harry Richardson, Private Communities, Market Institutions, and Planning, (Jan. 2002)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).

292 Harold Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights, 7 J. L. & ECON.
11, 24-25 (1964).
293 MacCallum, The Case for Land Lease Versus Subdivision, supra note 291, at 371,
379.
294 See Fred E. Foldvary, ProprietaryCommunities and Community Associations, in THE
VOLUNTARY CITY, supra note 260, at 264-65.
295 Id.

296 See FOLDVARY, PUBLIC GOODS AND PRIVATE COMMUNITIES, supra note 255, at 114-33
(discussing all of the community goods Disney provides).
297 See FRIEDERICH A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER (1992), at 77-91,
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officials make bad decisions, they may need to worry about being298fired or being
voted out of office, but the feedback mechanism is much less direct.

How do private parties get compensated for providing local public goods?
Although there might not be explicit prices for goods like roads, bundling them
with goods that must be purchased, such as housing, enables the private party to
recoup his or her investment when the price of the private good increases. A home
with a road next to it is worth more than a home with no road at all; therefore, if
providing a road makes sense, then the developer will have an incentive to provide
it. As economist Tyler Cowen points out:
Shopping malls and condominiums are other examples of the use of tying
arrangements for public goods supply. In the case of shopping malls, public
goods such as streets and security are paid299for through the provision of private
goods such as shoes, clothing, and books.

They essentially tie the provision of public goods that have no price with the
provision of private goods that have an explicit price, and as long as there is a
competitive market in housing, there will be an efficient provision of housing and
the accompanying public goods. The literature on private communities by authors
MacCallum, Foldvary, Deng, Gordon, and Richardson further explores the
advantages of such arrangements."'
Some might wonder whether privately produced public goods would work on a
large scale. Although great weight is often attached to the importance of spillover
effects for local government services,3 ' Cowen argues that "[m]ost real-world
public goods, however, are local," rather than, "national or global, which implies
that there is only one community and that it has a fixed membership. 3 2 Tom
Means and Stephen Mehay test such a hypothesis econometrically and conclude
that, "most local government services do not exhibit a significant degree of
3 3
publicness.""
Given that the externalities or spillover or neighborhood effects of
these public goods are very local, it is not surprising to see so many private
communities providing them on their own. Foldvary and Beito, Gordon, and
Tabarrok provide the most comprehensive discussions of how private communities

A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 81-86 (Harper & Bros. 3d ed.
1950) (1942) for an explanation of creative destruction from profit and losses.
298 MITCHELL & SIMMONS, supra note 203, at 66-82.
299 COWEN,

supra note 291, at 10.

300 FOLDVARY, PUBLIC GOODS AND PRIVATE COMMUNITIES,

THE ART OF COMMUNITY, supra note

supra note 255; MACCALLUM,

291; MacCallum, The Quickening of Social Evolution,

supra note 291; Spencer MacCallum, The Case for Land Lease Versus Subdivision, supra

note 291; Deng, Gordon & Richardson, supra note 291.
301 John H. Y. Edwards, Congestion Function Specification and the "Publicness" of
Local Public Goods, 27 J. URB. ECON. 80, 94-95 (1990).
302 COWEN, supra note 291, at 14.
303 Tom S. Means & Stephen L. Mehay, Estimating the Publicness of Local Government

Services: Alternative Congestion FunctionSpecifications, 61 S. ECON. J. 614, 626 (1995).
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can provide local public goods."3 Developers have used private funds to create
entire communities, like Lake Havasu City, Arizona and Irvine Ranch,
California." 5 As of 1998, there were about 205,000 neighborhood associations in
the United States, housing nearly forty-two million residents and providing a
multitude of services including garbage collection, street maintenance, snow
removal, gardening, and maintenance of common areas and recreational
facilities.3 °6
These private associations are not all small condominium associations or
entertainment complexes such as Disney World. Some are quite large permanent
residential and commercial areas that provide a wide range of public goods for
which many politically governed jurisdictions charge impact fees. Ford's Colony
near Williamsburg, Virginia is a private 2,500 acre community of single-family
houses, town homes, and condominiums that owns all of its own streets and
operates a golf course.3" 7 Sea Ranch, California is a private community with more
than 10,000 residents.3"' Sea Ranch provides community goods such as roads,
sewers, electricity, fire protection, security patrols, hiking trails, golf, tennis,
swimming, and a private airstrip.3"9 Although some cities charge impact fees for
parks, Arne notes, "Sea Ranch is a park; its commissioners merely put the roads
and trails in to let people enjoy nature's wonders. These entrepreneur-mandated
improvements, coupled with extensive rules of preservation, took the place of city
park commissions and charitable donors."3 1 Reston, Virginia is a mixed-use,
privately planned and constructed community where more than 40,000 people
reside and 22,000 people work, and it remains unincorporated in Fairfax County,
"
despite its size.31
' Reston has a mix of single-family detached homes, apartments,
commercial and light-industrial businesses as well as schools, lakes, trails, and golf
courses."' Reston has 1,045 acres of open space that include woodland, trails, a
park with horse and jogging trails, four lakes, ponds, gardens, two golf courses,
sports fields, tennis courts, playgrounds, sixteen swimming pools, and lakes for
fishing and boating.313 Overall, there are twenty acres of recreational facilities and
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305
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parks per 1,000 residents of Reston.314 This exceeds the recommended 9.7 acres
established by the National Recreation Association.315
The justification for impact fees is that development entails costs that spill over
onto existing residents, yet these costs exist only because of the way tax dollars
currently finance services such as roads, sewers, and refuse collection. If private
resources provided all these goods instead, impact fees would be unnecessary in the
first place. Although municipalities charge impact fees for numerous "public
goods," the market provides nearly all of these services in various places.3 16 Private
provision avoids the calculation and implementation problems. The use of
government impact fees to pay for provision of "public" goods and services is not
as necessary as many people presume, and we would do well to minimize the
inefficiencies they create by privatizing as many of these goods as possible.
V. CONCLUSION

Development fees are not as close to the ideal corrective device as many people
assume. One could imagine impact fees being set according to the marginal impact
development has on a community, but despite the legal requirement in places like
California that impact fees are supposed to approximate marginal impact, in
practice they do not. Each individual development has a different impact. For
there to be a true nexus between a fee and a development's marginal impact,
planners would have to individually evaluate each development for a unique
charge. Governments are unable to calculate specific, or even average, marginal
impacts of developments, so they assess fees in myriad questionable ways.
Development impact fees vary greatly between jurisdictions with many imposing
fees that are difficult to justify. Many governments simply come up with a wish
list of public projects and then try to get them financed by developers. In these
cases, the impact fees are nothing more than a general tax on development.
Eliminating impact fees will encourage development and make real estate more
affordable.
The elimination of development impact fees need not burden existing residents
with any spill over costs of new development. Private resources have provided
new roads and other "public goods," which impact fees currently finance. Reforms
should move these goods back to the private sector while simultaneously
eliminating impact fees to ensure a more efficient level, mix, and dispersion of
development.

314
315
316

Id. at 180.
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